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THE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT REGULATIONS,
1973: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS REMEDY OR
REGULATION OF MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS?
The problems raised by the U.S. direct investment regulations
are only one aspect of the greater problem of the multi-national
corporation.1
Since January 1, 1968, American corporations with foreign in-
vestment interests have been subject to mandatory restrictions on
direct investment abroad. President Johnson created these restric-
tions, known as the Foreign Direct Investment Regulations, by Ex-
ecutive Order for the purpose of alleviating the worsening balance
of payments deficit.2 The order delegated authority to the Secre-
tary of Commerce to administer the Foreign Direct Investment
Regulations. He in turn created the Office of Foreign Direct In-
vestment and subdelegated to it all the authority he had received
under the Executive Order.8
The Constitution gives Congress the sole power to regulate "com-
merce with foreign nations."4 This foreign commerce power easily
encompasses the regulation of foreign direct investment5 since the
power comprehends "every species of commercial intercourse be-
tween the United States and foreign nations. No sort of trade can
be carried on between this country and any other to which this
power does not extend." Thus, the President has no authority in
1. Rehbinder, The Foreign Direct Investment Regulations: A European
Legal Point of View, 34 LAW & CONrsMN. PROB. 95, 117 (1969) (Footnote
omitted).
2. Exec. Order No. 11,387, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1973), 12 U.S.C. § 95a (Supp.
V, 1970).
3. Dep't of Commerce Order 184-A, 33 Fed. Reg. 54 (1968).
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
5. Foreign direct investment is mainly a movement of capital from
one country to another. The movement is accompanied by varying de-
grees of control, technology, and management. See C. KINDLEBMaGER,
AwucAR Busnm-ss AROAD (1969).
6. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 85, 9 Wheat. 1, 193-94 (1824). The
foreign commerce power is "exclusive and plenary. As an exclusive
power, its exercise may not be limited, qualified or impeded to any ex-
tent . . . ." Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ill. v. United States, 289 U.S. 48,
56-57 (1933).
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this area except that delegated to him by Congress.7
Congress, in the Trading with the Enemy Act, delegated au-
thority to the President to regulate some aspects of foreign com-
merce "[d] uring time of war or during any other period of national
emergency declared by the President."8 Relying on this delegation
and the national emergency declared by President Truman in 1950
(which is still in effect), 9 President Johnson issued the Foreign
Direct Investment Regulations.'"
The President in acting pursuant to this emergency power is
constrained by its inherent limitations. Congress delegated the
President this power so that he would have the ability to effec-
tively respond to an emergency-not so he could regulate com-
merce in areas unrelated to the emergency.
The executive order identified the balance of payments crisis
as one aspect of the declared emergency of 1950.11 Whether in
actuality it is such a part has been severely questioned.' 2 How-
ever, granting that it is, the response-to-a-crisis rationale applies:
the President is authorized to act only if he is responding to the
balance of payments crisis. The necessity of such a response is the
sole justification for the bypassing of Congress in adopting these
Regulations. Likewise, the continuance of the Regulations is le-
7. The President's foreign relations powers do not give him authority
to regulate foreign commerce although on occasion foreign commerce
does affect foreign affairs. That the President was aware of the dich-
otomy is clearly shown by Paragraph (5) of the Executive Order which
provides that the "Secretary of State shall advise the Secretary of Com-
merce ... with respect to matters under this Order involving foreign
policy." Exec. Order No. 11,387, 3 C.F.R. 200, 201 (1973), 12 U.S.C. § 95a
(Supp. V, 1970). (Emphasis added).
Further, the very act of delegating authority to the Secretary of Com-
merce as opposed to the Secretary of State implies that the President
considered the Regulations to be a matter of foreign commerce-not for-
eign policy.
8. Section 5 (b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act, originally enacted
as the Act of October 6, 1917, ch. 106, § 5(b), 40 Stat. 415, has been amended
several times and is now codified at both 12 U.S.C. § 95a (1970), and 50
U.S.C. App. § 5(b) (1970).
9. Proclamation No. 2914, Dec. 16, 1950, 50 U.S.C. App., notes preced-
ing § 1 (1970).
10. Exec. Order No. 11,387, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1973), 12 U.S.C. § 95a (Supp.
V, 1970). Although the reliance on the 1950 emergency is patently ques-
tionable, there has been no court challenge of the Regulations on this
point, nor, for that matter, have there been any court decisions whatsoever
on the Regulations.
11. Id.
12. See Garson & Miller, The Foreign Direct Investment Regulations:
Constitutional Questions and Operational Aspects Examined, 11 B.C. Im.
& Com. L. REv. 143 (1970); Comment, The Foreign Direct Investment
Controls, 11 HAnv. INT'L L.J. 490 (1970).
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gitimate only so long as their essential purpose as a balance of
payments remedy is maintained.
This paper proposes to examine the gradual changes that have
occurred in the Regulations since their inception and to raise the
question whether the original purpose of the Regulations has been
forgotten. This writer suggests the possibility that the main pur-
pose of the controls is no longer to remedy the balance of payments
deficit, but to observe and regulate the large U.S. based multi-na-
tional corporations.
THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS CRISIS
To understand the impact of the Regulations on the balance of
payments, the essentials of the balance of payments must first be
comprehended.
In the simplest terms, a nation incurs a balance of payments
deficit whenever more units are paid out than are returned. Un-
der the "liquidity" concept presently used by the United States
Department of Commerce, the definition of "balance" is not, how-
ever, merely a matter of applying accounting techniques to all
transactions involving foreigners. An analysis of the nature and
purpose of the transaction must be made, and only those trans-
actions that are "regular" are included in the balance computa-
tion. Within this definitional framework income from United
States investments abroad, foreign investments in the United States,
and returns on United States exports are the regular transactions
that have a positive impact on the payments account, and gov-
ernmental spending abroad, private foreign investment, and pay-
ments for foreign imports are the deficit transactions. 13
Foreign direct investment is "an outflow of capital which gives
foreigners the same purchasing power they would have if the
money came from the sale of imports to the United States."'14
Therefore, it is a debit item in computing the balance of pay-
ments.
To limit foreign direct investment is to reduce this negative in-
crement in the balance of payments calculation. However, since
U.S. corporations expect to repatriate more than they invest from
profits (which have a positive impact) in the long run a limitation
on investment may increase the deficit. Thus, by helping the bal-
13. Comment, Governmental Regulation of Foreign Investment, 47
TEXAs L. REv. 421, 421-22 (1969) (Footnote omitted).
14. Id, at 427.
ance of payments situation in the short-run, the Regulations may
be hurting it over the long run.15
AN OvERvIEw or THE FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT REGULATIONS' 6
The Foreign Direct Investment Regulations apply only to "Direct
Investors."1' A Direct Investor is any person (whether an indi-
vidual or a business entity) within the United States that owns
or controls a 10 percent or greater interest in any incorporated or
unincorporated foreign entity.18 A foreign entity in which such
interest is owned is designated an "Affiliated Foreign National."' 9
Direct Investors are prohibited from making any positive direct
investment in Affiliated Foreign Nationals during any year, be-
ginning with 1968, except as authorized under the "general allow-
ables" provided in the Regulations or an amount specifically au-
thorized by the Office of Foreign Direct Investment for a particu-
lar individual.20
Direct investment by a Direct Investor is calculated on a calen-
dar year basis by adding together the Direct Investor's net transfer
of capital to Affiliated Foreign Nationals and the Direct Investor's
share of earnings from its incorporated Affiliated Foreign Na-
tionals that were reinvested abroad.21
"Net transfer of capital" is defined as (a) the aggregate trans-
15. See Fischer, The Multinationals and the Crisis in United States
Trade and Investment Policy, 53 Bos. U. L. REv. 308, 331-32 (1973); Behr-
man, Assessing the Foreign Investment Controls, 34 LAw & CoNTErnv.
PROB. 84, 85-6 (1969).
16. 15 C.F.R. §§ 1000.101 et. seq. (1973). The Regulations are cited here-
inafter as Section -, omitting from each section reference the prefix 1000.
The summary is accurate up to August 15, 1973, and takes into account the
recent amendments in 38 Fed. Reg. 16635 (June 25, 1973). Considerable
reliance has been placed on the 1972 General Bulletin: Interpretative Ex-
planation and Analysis of the Foreign Direct Investment Regulations
[hereinafter cited as 1972 Bulletin] which provides a section by section
analysis of the Regulations. Although superseded in some respects by the
recent changes in the Regulations, the 1972 Bulletin has proved invaluable
in deciphering the complex and intricate Regulations. The 1972 Bulletin
has been published in 37 Fed. Reg. 18294 (September 9, 1972) and reprints
are presently available from the Office of Foreign Direct Investment.
However, since the Office has regularly issued revised and updated Bulle-
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fers of capital by a Direct Investor to its incorporated Affiliated
Foreign Nationals during the year, minus (b) the aggregate trans-
fers of capital to the Direct Investor by its Affiliated Foreign Na-
tionals during the same period, plus (c) the Direct Investor's share
of net increase or decrease in the net assets of its Affiliated Foreign
Nationals.
22
To compute the other component of direct investment, the Di-
rect Investor's share of earnings from its incorporated Affiliated
Foreign Nationals that were reinvested abroad, "reinvested earn-
ings" must first be derived. This is calculated by taking (a) the
total earnings of the Direct Investor's incorporated Affiliated
Foreign Nationals, subtracting (b) the dividends paid by the in-
corporated Affiliated Foreign Nationals to the Direct Investor and
certain other Affiliated Foreign Nationals, and then adding (c)
dividends and remittances received by the incorporated Affiliated
Foreign Nationals from certain other Affiliated Foreign Nationals.23
The Direct Investor's share of the reinvested earnings is simply
that proportion he would be entitled to were the earnings not re-
invested.
Direct investment is not prohibited per se. The general prohi-
bition on direct investment is addressed only to "positive direct
investment," that is, direct investment during the year greater than
zero. 24 Since, as defined above, direct investment measures the
net effect of transactions, it is conceivable that in any given year
direct investment can be negative, and the Direct Investor would
therefore not come under the Regulations.
Subpart E contains the "general allowables" exception to the
general prohibition against positive direct investment. At present,
the Direct Investor must elect one of the three general allowables
each year, and he is authorized to make positive direct investment
for that year in accordance with the provisions of the elected al-
lowable. 
2 5
The "general allowables" are based on a "scheduled areas" de-




25, Section 502 as amended in 38 Fed. Reg. 16635 (June 25, 1973).
world is assigned to one of three "scheduled areas" (A, B, and C).28
Schedule A generally comprises the least developed countries of
the world; Schedule B, certain specified developed countries (al-
though generally not the "highly developed countries") of the
world; and Schedule C, the remaining countries (generally West-
ern European countries-which also are generally very highly de-
veloped) .27 However, the scheduled areas do not include countries
that are subject to Treasury or Commerce Department economic
controls because of their dominance by "International Commu-
nism."28 There are also a few areas under United States protection
that are not subject to the Regulations.29 Finally, although Canada
is listed as a Schedule B country, Direct Investors are allowed to in-
vest in Canadian Affiliated Foreign Nationals "without limitation as
to amount."30 This effectively removes Canada from the "general
allowables" design and hence from the schedular framework.
The first of the three "general allowables" a Direct Investor may
choose is the "worldwide minimum allowable." This allowable
places a ceiling on the total amount of positive direct investment
that a Direct Investor may make in all scheduled areas. Currently,
the ceiling is $6 million per year.81
The Direct Investor has a second choice of an historical allowable
for each scheduled area based on the Direct Investor's direct in-
vestment in each such area during 1965-66.32 The Direct Investor
is allowed to invest a percentage of the average amount of invest-
ment he made in each scheduled area in 1965-66. The percentage
allowed varies with the scheduled area. Currently, the percent-
age allowed for Schedule A is 110%; Schedule B, 65%; and Schedule
C, 35%.
3
The Direct Investor, as a final alternative, may elect an "earnings
allowable" for each scheduled area based on the Direct Investor's
share of Affiliated Foreign National earnings in each such area
during the preceding year.3 4 Positive direct investment is author-
ized in each area up to 40 percent of the Direct Investor's share of
26. Section 319 and I.R.C. (26 U.S.C.A.) § 4916(b). A list of the coun-
tries in each schedule can be found in DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1972 FOREIGN
DnEcr INVESTMENT PROGRmM, 21-2 (1972).
27. D.p'ET OF CoMvMRcE,, 1972 FOREIGN DIRECT INVEsTmNT PROGRAM,
21-2 at pts. I, 11, and M (1972).
28. Id. at pt. M.
29. Id. at pt. IV.
30. Section 1102.
31. Section 503 as amended in 38 Fed. Reg. 16635 (June 25, 1973).
32. Section 504(a) and (c).
33. Section 504(a).
34. Section 504(b).
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Affiliated Foreign National earnings in the area during the preced-
ing year.3 5
In addition to the elected allowable, Direct Investors are eligible
for a worldwide "incremental earnings" allowable. This supple-
mental allowable is based on the amount by which aggregate Af-
filiated Foreign National earnings in a calendar year exceed the
average of such earnings during 1966-67.36
Unused earnings and historical allowables in one schedule may
be passed "downstream" (from C to B or A and from B to A) to
other schedules.37 The historical allowables may also be passed
"upstream" up to the limit of the earnings allowable in the higher
schedule. 8 Finally, if the historical earnings or incremental earn-
ings allowables are not fully utilized during the calendar year, the
excess can be carried forward to the next year.3 9
Shifting away from the direct investment restrictions, two other
fundamental requirements are imposed on all Direct Investors.
First, the amount of assets that a Direct Investor may hold in liquid
form in a foreign country (other than Canada) is restricted.
40
Such balances presently may not exceed the sum of (a) the amount
of available proceeds of long-term foreign borrowing by the Direct
Investor, and (b) the greater of $100,000 or the average month-end
liquid foreign balances held by the Direct Investor during 1965-
66.41
Secondly, all Direct Investors must file reports reflecting the
allowables and transactions pertinent to foreign direct invest-
ment.42 The Regulations authorize the Secretary of Commerce to
require a report on information "reasonably related to direct in-
vestment or the purposes of Executive Order 11,387."-13 The Regu-
lations further require the Direct Investor to keep a "full and ac-
35. Id.
36. Section 506, with an amendment in Section 506(a) (4), 38 Fed. Reg.
16635 (June 25, 1973).
37. Section 504(d).
38. Section 504(c).
39. Sections 504(d) and (e), and 506(d).
40. Section 203, with an amendment in Section 203(d) (2), 38 Fed. Reg.
16635 (June 25, 1973).
41. Section 203 (c).
42. Sections 601-02.
43. Section 602(a).
curate record of each transaction engaged in by it which is subject
to the provisions" of the Regulations.
44
There are four reports generally required of all Direct Investors:
(1) The FDI-101 Base Period Report; (2) The FDI-102 Cumulative
Quarterly Report; (3) The FDI-102F Annual Report (a short form
of this report analogous to the Federal Income Tax short form is
available to those Direct Investors who elected the worldwide min-
imum allowable); (4) The Form FDI-105 Report for Affiliated For-
eign National Financial Structure and Related Data. Addition-
ally, there are other reports required by the Office of Foreign Di-
rect Investment applicable only to special types of Direct Inves-
tors.45 However, there are certain exemptions from these reporting
requirements that enable the small and medium-sized investors to
avoid the reports. Thus, the reporting requirements fall primarily
on the large investors.
46
Finally, it should be noted that the Office of Foreign Direct In-
vestment, in extraordinary circumstances, will grant requests from
Direct Investors for specific authorizations of positive direct invest-
ment that are not permitted under the general allowables. 47
THE MULTI-NATIONAL CORPORATION
There is no universally accepted definition of a multi-national
corporation. This is due in part to the recent development of the
multi-national corporation, and in part to the failure of economists
and international business experts to agree on what comprises a
multi-national corporation. 48 Some experts ascribe the same
meaning to the terms "multi-national," "international," "transna-
tional," and "worldwide" in describing corporate entities.49 Other
experts use each of these words to describe a different, though re-
lated, entity.50 Nevertheless, there are certain characteristics gen-
erally attributed to the multi-national corporation which in the ag-
gregate describe the creature sufficiently well for the purposes of
this paper.
44. Section 601.
45. Section 602 (b).
46. See Comment, Foreign Direct Investment Controls, 11 HARv. INT'L
L.J. 490, 527 (1970).
47. Section 801.
48. See R. EELLS, GLOBAL CORPORATIONS 19-42 (1972).
49. See, e.g., L. TURNER, INVwsiLE EinmnmESs 2-3 (1970); R. VERNON, SOVER-
EIGNTYAT BAY 3 (1971).
50. See, e.g., C. KINDLEBERGER, AmIucA BusnrESS ABROAD 179-85 (1969);
A. PHATAK, EVOLUTION OF WORLD ENTERPRISES 1-3 (1971).
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The first essential of the multi-national corporation is that it
own and manage business in two or more countries.5'
Secondly, a multi-national corporation is "an agency of direct, as
opposed to portfolio, investment in foreign countries, holding and
managing the underlying physical assets rather than securities
based upon these assets."
52
Corporate enormity is a third attribute of the multi-national cor-
poration. Multi-national corporations, for the most part, are mem-
bers of that select group of U.S. corporate giants: Fortune's list
of 500 U.S. industrial firms.53 One authority on the multi-national
corporation has noted that an enterprise "with less than $100 mil-
lion in sales rarely merits much attention."54  "Perhaps 200-300
large firms form the bulk of the multi-national corporation uni-
verse."
55
Power seems to be a main characteristic of the multi-national.
One expert claims this is indeed an attribute of the multi-national,
but only as a derivative of a less visible trait: the integrated de-
cision process.56 This trait begins when control over affiliates be-
comes centralized, usually in the parent, and is exercised to coor-
dinate all activity in that enterprise toward a common objective.57
As a worldwide enterprise grows more centralized, it becomes more
multi-national in character.
While admittedly multi-nationals cannot be visualized in any
concrete and specific manner, this paper is using the term to mean
an entity with the following attributes: (1) an agency of direct
rather than portfolio investment, (2) a corporation owning and
managing in two or more countries, (3) an institution that is in
some vague way enormous, and (4) a centralized enterprise with
an integrated decision process.
51. Jacoby, The Multi-national Corporation, TNE CENTER MAGAZINE, VoL
3, No. 3, 38 (May 1970).
52. Id.
53. R. VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY, 4-18 (1971).
54. Id. at 4.
55. SENATE CoMM. ON FINANCE, 93D CONG., 1ST SESSION, MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS 44 (Comm. Print 1973).
56. J. Behrman, Some Patterns in the Rise of the Multi-national Enter-
prise, Research Paper 18, Grad. School of Bus., U. of N.C. at Chapel Hill
(March 1969) as discussed by R. EELLS, GLOBAL CoRPoRATIoNs 25-30 (1972).
57. Id.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FOREIGN DIRECT TNVESTMENT
REGULATIONS AND THE MULTI-NATIONAL CORPORATION
[T]he program falls heaviest on the multi-national enterprise
and, in effect, represents a step, even though unilateral, toward
their control.
58
The Direct Investor, as stated above, is defined in the Regula-
tions as any U.S. person (whether an individual person or business
entity) that owns or controls a ten percent or greater interest in
any incorporated or unincorporated foreign entity. This paper is
concerned with the restrictions placed on the Direct Investor who
is a multi-national corporation compared to the restrictions placed
on the Direct Investor who is not.
The essential part of the definition of Direct Investor relates to
"ownership or control" in a foreign entity. One of the principal
characteristics of the multi-national corporation, as discussed above,
is that it is a "corporation owning and managing in two or more
countries." The close identity here indicates the unavoidable im-
pact that the Regulations have on the multi-national corporation.
The 10 percent ownership or control requirement can be viewed
as an educated guess at where control over an Affiliated Foreign
National begins."9 Since control in each specific case may begin
at a different percentage, the 10 percent figure is probably as use-
ful as any other arbitrary figure. Further, although the figure is
probably low (usually a higher percentage of equity ownership is
thought to guarantee control), the Regulations provide that in
some cases a person may qualify as a Direct Investor with a lower
percentage of equity ownership. 0 Such a determination is made
by the Office of Foreign Direct Investment where the U.S. person is
found to actually participate in and exercise a controlling influ-
ence over the affairs of the foreign enterprise.61
Hence, the Regulations effectively assure that any U.S. person
who controls a foreign enterprise qualifies as a Direct Investor.
Multi-national corporations by definition so qualify. Obviously
then, all U.S. multi-national corporations are subject to the Regu-
lations.
Thus, the Regulations, implemented to remedy the balance of
payment deficit, had the collateral effect of regulating the activi-
ties of the multi-national corporation. This writer suggests that
58. Comment, Foreign Direct Investment Controls, 11 HARv. INTI'L L.J.
490, 563-64 (1970).
59. See C. KINDLEBERGER, AivaRICAN BusINEsS ABROAD 3-4 (1969).
60. Section 304(b) (4).
61. See 1972 Bulletin § B305.
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this unintentional side effect has become a major factor in the con-
tinuance of the controls while their efficacy as a balance of pay-
ments remedy has gradually been reduced. To show this we must
analyze the changes in the Regulations since their inception-com-
paring the effect of the changes on the balance of payments to the
continued regulation of the multi-national corporation.
THE SHIFTING EmPHASIs OF THE REGULATIONS
The Regulations, even at their inception, were not totally com-
mitted to reducing the balance of payments deficit. One particu-
larly noticeable manifestation of this is the adoption of the sched-
ular approach to investment. From the pure accounting aspect
of the balance of payments, positive direct investment is equally
detrimental whether occurring in Nigeria, Canada, Israel, Japan, or
Denmark. However, by affording different treatment to invest-
ment in different areas, investment may be encouraged or dis-
couraged according to political expediency.
In general, the United States has maintained a policy of aiding
underdeveloped countries-this policy is continued under the Reg-
ulations by classifying such countries in Schedule A (which
throughout the entire life of the controls has been the Schedule
easiest to invest in).62
Canada is not included under the controls, and investment can be
made without limit there.63 Israel is classed as a Schedule A coun-
try.64 Japan is classed as a Schedule B country.65 Obviously, pref-
erential treatment is being conferred for political reasons. In short,
policy considerations other than concern for the balance of pay-
ments entered into the Regulations.
The Regulations are structured so that all positive direct invest-
ment is prohibited except as authorized under the allowables. The
allowables permit positive direct investment up to a certain limit
depending on the choice of allowable made. This "maximum limit"
design necessarily involves a size relationship between those who
are restricted and those who are not. Since the multi-national cor-
62. Section 319.
63. Section 1102.
64. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1972 FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT PROGRAM,
21-2 at pt. I (1972).
65. Id. at pt. 1I.
poration is a supergiant with large direct investment activities as
part of its very nature, a high limit will not remove it from regula-
tion. However, the higher the limit the fewer "normal" investors
will be regulated.
When the controls were first instituted in 1968, the allowables
were set very low-thus, almost all Direct Investors who were
subject to the Regulations were in fact actually restricted in their
investment. The 1968 program authorized an election between a
$200,000 worldwide allowable and a combination allowable that
comprises an allowable similar to the present historical allowable
for Schedules A and B, and a very limited allowable for Schedule
C.06 The combination allowable permitted a Direct Investor to
make positive direct investment for 1968 in Schedule A up to an
amount equal to 110% of the average annual investment in that
schedule in 1965 and 1966. Similarly, positive direct investment in
Schedule B was limited to 65% of the 1965-66 annual average in-
vestment. However, the amount of positive direct investment al-
lowed in Schedule C was strictly limited: a Direct Investor could
only reinvest earnings from his Schedule C Affiliated Foreign Na-
tionals up to an amount equal to the lesser of (a) 35% of his aver-
age annual positive direct investment in the years 1965-66, or (b)
a percentage of the Direct Investor's share of such annual total
earnings equal to the percentage of the Direct Investor's share of
the aggregate total earnings of his incorporated Schedule C Affili-
ated Foreign Nationals during 1964, 1965, and 1966.67
The 1968 program thus imposed rather strict controls-especially
for Direct Investors without substantial investment or earnings
from previous investment in the years 1964-66. Criticism was lev-
eled at the Regulations for giving the heavy investor in those
years a better investment opportunity. Particularly upsetting to
some investors was that those who had constrained themselves as
requested under President Johnson's voluntary restraint program
were penalized in favor of those who had ignored the program.68
The Regulations were extensively liberalized in 1969 with respect
to the allowables.69
66. 15 C.F.R. § 1000.502 (1969); General Bulletin No. 1, Interpretative
Analyses and Statements § B502, 33 Fed. Reg. 15158 (Oct. 10, 1968)
[hereinafter cited as Gen. Bull. No. 1]. The worldwide allowable was
originally set at $100,000 for 1968, but was raised during the year to
$200,000. The $200,000 limit is the figure used in Gen. Bull. No. 1, since
it reflects the amount finally allowed for that year.
67. Gen. Bull. No. 1, §§ B503 and B504.
68. See Spuehler, The New United States Foreign Direct Investment
Program-Post-Mortem and Prognosis, 43 L.A.B. BulL. 325, 348 (1968).
69. 15 C.F.R. §§ 1000.502-06 (1970); 1969 General Bulletin: Interpreta-
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Subpart E (§§ 501-506) was changed, in the main, to its 1973
form in that the Direct Investor was allowed to elect one of three
allowables: worldwide minimum, historical, or earnings.1 0
The Direct Investor could, as in 1968, elect to be governed by the
worldwide minimum allowable. However, the ceiling was raised
to $1 million from its 1968 ceiling of $200,0001 This huge increase
meant that numerous Direct Investors who were affected in 1968
would not be affected in 1969.
The historical allowable remained as in effect in 1968.
7 2
In direct response to the criticisms that the 1968 Regulations pe-
nalized adherents of the voluntary restraint program, the Office
of Foreign Direct Investment created the "earnings allowable."
This allowable provided that in each scheduled area the Direct In-
vestor could make positive direct investment in an amount up to
thirty percent of the annual earnings of the Direct Investor's Af-
filiated Foreign National in the preceding year.73 Other than
changing the percentage to 40, the earnings allowable has remained
unaltered.
The 1969 Bulletin also announced that beginning in 1970 another
allowable would be available as a supplement to whichever of the
three general allowables was elected. This allowable, known as
the "incremental earnings allowable," authorized worldwide invest-
ment in an amount not to exceed the excess of (a) forty percent
of the difference between the Direct Investor's share of total earn-
ings of his Affiliated Foreign Nationals in the current year and
the average annual earnings of such Affiliated Foreign Nationals
in 1966-67, over (b) the Direct Investor's minimum allowable, earn-
ings allowable, or historical allowables for the regulated year,
whichever is highest7 4 "Generally, this additional allowable may
benefit only Direct Investors who have Affiliated Foreign Nationals
with an unusually high growth rate of earnings. 1 5
tive Explanation and Analysis of the Foreign Direct Investment Regula-
tions, Introduction, and §§ B502-06, 34 Fed. Reg. 17806 (Nov. 5, 1969)
[hereinafter cited as 1969 Bulletin].
70. Id.
71. 1969 Bulletin § B503.
72. 1969 Bulletin § B504.
73. Id.
74. 1969 Bulletin § B506.
75, 1969 Bulletin, Introduction.
The 1970 Program continued the liberalizing trend.7 6 Another
alternative allowable was authorized, giving the Direct Investor a
choice of four different allowables from which to elect. This al-
lowable, designated the "alternative minimum and Schedule A
supplemental allowable" (also called simply the "§ 507 allowable"),
provided that a Direct Investor could make $1 million positive direct
investment on a modified worldwide basis and an additional $4
million in Schedule A. In effect, so long as the Direct Investor did
not invest more than $1 million in Schedules B and C combined,
he could make up to $5 million in positive direct investment per
year.
77
The § 507 allowable was a major increase in the ceiling with re-
spect to the balance of payments. Furthermore, the schedular pref-
erence reflected the overriding concern with the policy of helping
the developing nations by encouraging U.S. investment in Schedule
A.
The 1970 Regulations also streamlined the historical allowable
for Schedule C. Schedule C assumed the same method of com-
putation used in computing the Schedule A and B historical allow-
ables. Thus, the Direct Investor was relieved of compliance with
the strict and complex "reinvestment ratio" formula. A 35 per-
cent limit, which is still the limit today, was adopted for Schedule
C.78
Prior to 1970, Direct Investors were required to disregard 'annual
"aggregate losses" in computing their positive direct investment
for compliance with the worldwide minimum allowable limit. This
requirement was eliminated in 1970, thus permitting the Direct
Investor who elected the worldwide minimum to subtract his an-
nual "aggregate loss" from direct investment.79 The effect was to
raise the limit for all Direct Investors who had such losses.
The 1971 Regulations remained essentially the same with respect
to the allowables. Nonetheless, the liberalizing trend continued
in that the limit of the minimum worldwide allowable was raised
to $2 million per year,80 the limit of the alternative minimum al-
76. 15 C.F.R. §§ 1000.502-06 (1971); 1970 General Bulletin: Interpreta-
tive Explanation and Analysis of the Foreign Direct Investment Regula-
tions, Introduction, 35 Fed. Reg. 15671 (Oct. 7, 1970) [hereinafter cited as
1970 Bulletin).
77. 1970 Bulletin § B507.
78. 1970 Bulletin § B504.
79. 1970 Bulletin § B503.
80. 15 C.F.R. § 1000.503 (1972); Supplement No. 1 to the 1970 Bulletin,
§ B503, 36 Fed. Reg. 9502 (May 26, 1971) [hereinafter cited as Supp. No.
1].
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lowable segment of the § 507 allowable was correspondingly in-
creased to $2 million,8 ' and finally the restriction on the earnings
allowable was lifted to 40 percent.
8 2
The allowables provided under the Regulations for 1972 were the
same as for 1971.83
Recent changes in the allowables were adopted on June 25, 1973.84
The worldwide minimum allowable was raised from $2 million to
$6 million per year; the § 507 allowable was completely revoked;
and the wording of the incremental allowable was changed so as
not to be tied to the worldwide minimum allowable. Thus, a re-
duction in the amount of the incremental allowable, which would
have normally followed from an increase in the worldwide mini-
mum allowable, was avoided.8 5
In summary, the general allowables have been substantially lib-
eralized over the period of years since the Regulations went into
effect. The worldwide minimum allowable has been elevated from
$100,000 to $6 million-sixty times the original limit. The historical
allowables for Schedule A and B have remained unchanged since
the 1968 Bulletin, but the Schedule C historical allowable has
been relieved of its previously strict limits so that it is now the
same conceptually as the Schedule A and B allowables. Still the
35% limit is considerably stiffer than the 65% or 110% limits set
for Schedules B and A respectively. The earnings allowable has
been liberalized to 40% from the 30% restriction originally set
in 1969. Finally, the supplemental incremental allowable has given
an additional amount of authorized positive direct investment to
the Direct Investors who have Affiliated Foreign Nationals with un-
usually high earnings growth rates.
The result of the liberalization obviously reduces the effect of
the Regulations as a short term balance of payments remedy. The
more positive direct investment that is allowed per year, the
greater the debit in this segment of the balance of payments com-
putation.
81. Supp. No. 1 § B507.
82. Supp. No. 1 § B504.
83. 15 C.F.R. § 1000.501-07 (1973); 1972 Bulletin §§ B501-07.
84. 38 Fed. Reg. 16635 (June 25, 1973). The amendments apply to all
affected transactions entered into on or after January 1, 1973.
85. Sections 503, 506, 507 as amended in 38 Fed. Reg. 16635 (June 25,
1973). See Explanatory Paragraph (6), 38 Fed. Reg. 16636 (June 25, 1973).
However, while the liberalization of the allowables had a gener-
ally negative effect on the balance of payments, it did not uni-
formly affect all Direct Investors.
The changes eliminated many of the smaller Direct Investors from
substantive regulation under the Regulations. Any Direct Inves-
tor whose normal positive direct investment falls between the orig-
inal $200,000 and the present $6 million is no longer affected by
the Regulations.
On the other hand, the multi-national corporation has been gen-
erally unaffected by the increase in the allowable limits. This par-
adox stems from the position of the multi-national corporation in
direct investment in the years 1965-66. The multi-national corpo-
ration generally had investment in this period at such a level as to
dictate the election of the historical allowables as the choice which
would maximize its positive direct investment abroad. The multi-
national corporation would similarly not be the user of the earn-
ings allowable, but would be the beneficiary of the supplemental
incremental earnings allowable if its Affiliated Foreign Nationals
had unusual growth of earnings.
The situation of a multi-national corporation with regard to
changes in the allowables can be illustrated as follows: multi-
national corporation X had positive direct investment of $10 mil-
lion in Schedule C, $8 million in Schedule B, and $5 million in
Schedule A in each of the years 1965 and 1966. Therefore, its
annual average positive direct investment for the 1965-66 base pe-
riod was $10 million, $8 million, and $5 million respectively. Cor-
poration X would have a Schedule B historical allowable of $5.2
million per year, a Schedule A allowable of $5.5 million per
year, and, from 1970 on, a Schedule C allowable of $3.5 million.
Thus, corporation X would have an aggregate allowable of $14.2
million which in practicality would preclude a selection of the
worldwide minimum allowable at any time. It should be obvious
that a multi-national corporation would not be affected by the
huge increase in the worldwide minimum allowable. Substantial
investment in the foreign arena during the base period 1965-66
virtually assures that the amount allowed will be greater under
the historical allowables than the worldwide minimum.
With regard to the Schedule C allowable, the multi-national cor-
poration received material benefit only whenever 35% of its an-
nual average positive direct investment in the years 1965-66 ex-
ceeded its share of the annual total earnings (setting the multi-
national corporation's share at the percentage it had in total earn-
ings in 1964-66).
[VOL. 11: 267, 1973] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Finally, the change in the percentage of the earnings allowable
will not generally affect the multi-national corporation because of
its large base period investment. However, recent additions to the
multi-national "club" will probably make use of the earnings al-
lowable since they would have no historical base in 1965-66 from
which to claim an historical allowable. However, a multi-na-
tional corporation may increase the annual earnings from its Af-
filiated Foreign Nationals to a level where the "earnings allow-
able" limitation would be less restrictive than the "historical al-
lowable." In such a case, of course, the 10 percent gain in allow-
able positive direct investment does reflect a liberalizing of the
restrictions on the multi-national corporation.
The second major restriction that the Regulations impose on the
Direct Investor, the limitation on the amount of liquid assets a
Direct Investor may hold during any given month in a foreign
country, has also been relaxed. Originally, the 1968 program re-
quired a Direct Investor to limit the amount of "liquid foreign bal-
ances" to the greater of (a) $25,000 or (b) the average end-of-
month balances held by the Direct Investor during 1965-66.81 The
1971 program elevated (a) to $100,000.8
7
The "liberalization" of the liquid foreign balance requirement
again can be seen to affect the Direct Investor whose historical bal-
ances during 1965-66 were relatively low. For reasons similar to
those discussed with regard to the allowables, the multi-national
corporation would thus be unaffected by the "liberalization." The
multi-national corporation would continue to use item (b), which
has remained unchanged, since for the multi-national corporation
item (b) would exceed item (a).
Although the original 1968 program imposed rather stringent
reporting requirements on all Direct Investors, gradually over the
past five years certain exemptions have been established that in
effect relieve the small and medium-sized Direct Investor from the
bulk of these requirements. The multi-national corporation, how-
ever, has not had its reporting requirements diminished, but ac-
tually has been required to submit more reports each year. Some
of these reports bear a questionable relation to the controls, but
86. 15 C.F.R. § 1000.203 (1969); Gen. Bull. No. 1 § B203.
87. 15 C.F.R. § 1000.203 (1972); 1972 Bulletin § B203.
nonetheless are authorized pursuant to the "reasonable relation-
ship of the information to direct investment" clause.88
CONCLUSION
Since the Foreign Direct Investment Regulations were initiated
by Presidential Order as an emergency measure aimed at alleviating
the balance of payments crisis, they have undergone gradual
changes that raise the question whether they are still aimed at that
crisis. As shown above, the Regulations have been liberalized to
a great extent. Limits on the positive direct investment have been
raised. Limits on the liquid foreign balances have been elevated.
Although undeniably the restriction of any positive investment at
all works as a positive factor in the control of the balance of
payments, restrictions that affect only some of the contributors to
the deficit while allowing others to act without restraint lack the
emergency element that is the justification for the Regulations'
existence. Half-measures and partial solutions are simply not emer-
gency measures. The liberalization of the controls indicate that
the emergency has passed, and this alone points out that the main-
tenance of the controls is of doubtful validity. " [ E]mergency del-
egation is not permanent, but is intended to cease when the emer-
gency conditions disappear."89
The further indications that the program in general has been
liberalized with little of the liberalization passed on to the multi-
national corporation suggests special emphasis on controlling the
multi-national corporation. The multi-national corporation, in ef-
fect, is the only segment of the class that the Regulations were to
control that is still being regulated.
Added together, the conclusion seems inescapable that the reason
for the continuation of the Regulations is principally to regulate
the multi-national corporation. As such, the Regulations seem
mainly to be a method of channeling the activities of the multi-
national corporation in a manner dictated by political preference.
This idea is reinforced by the information gathering on the multi-
national corporation that the Office of Foreign Direct Investment
is presently conducting through its extensive reporting require-
ments.
88. Sections 601-02.
89. Garson & Miller, Foreign Direct Investment Regulations: Constitu-
tional Questions and Operational Aspects Examined, 11 B.C. Iw. & Com.
L. REv. 143, 160 (1970).
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The Regulations no longer represent a response to the balance of
payments crisis. Therefore, the continuation of the Regulations
cannot be justified as a valid exercise of the emergency powers.
Since the President has authority to regulate foreign commerce
only under these emergency powers, the continuation of these Reg-
ulations is a usurpation of Congressional authority.
GREGG ALLEN JOHNSON
